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PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
The parties are: (a)Donald Rawlings ("Donald") and his spouse Jeanette Rawlings
("Jeanette"); (b) Arnold Dwayne Rawlings ("Dwayne") and his spouse Paulette
Rawlings ("Paulette"), individually and as Trustees of the Arnold Dwayne Rawlings
Family Trust; and (c) Theron LaRell Rawlings ("LaRell"), Bryce C. Rawlings ("Bryce")
and Carol Lynn R. Masterson ("Carol"). Donald, Dwyane, LaRell, Bruce and Carol are
siblings and their parents are Arnold J. Rawlings ("Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings ("Cleo").
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Court of Appeals' Opinion
The Court of Appeals' opinion is set forth as: Rawlings v. Rawlings, 2008 UT App
478 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
Date of Entry of Decision
The Court of Appeals' decision was issued on December 26, 2008.
Statutory Jurisdictional Provision
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Court of Appeals' decision pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE

Issue: Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a
constructive trust.
Standard of Review: "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals for
correctness. 'The correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that
court accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review.'" State v. Cram, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah 2002).
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Ordinances, Rules, and Regulations
There are no constitutional provisions or statutes directly applicable to the legal issues
present in this matter.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The court is being asked to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which
reversed the District Court's decision imposing a constructive trust on property described
in a deed dated signed by Arnold J. Rawlings and Cleo Rawlings dated March 24, 1967,
listing Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings as grantees. Arnold was the sole owner of
the property and intended only to make a temporary transfer, with Arnold's remaining
children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the trust property. (Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact f 57). The issue is whether the March 24,
1967 deed would allow the district court to properly impose a constructive trust as an
equitable remedy pursuant to Utah case law, Restatement (Second) of Trusts §45 or
Restatement of Restitution §160.
Course Proceedings and Disposition in the Lower Courts
The case was tried to the bench. The trial court ruled in favor of Dwayne, LaRell,
Bryce, and Carol, imposing a constructive trust on the property conveyed to Donald and
Jeanette in the 1967 and 1974 deeds. Donald and Jeanette appealed to the Utah Supreme
Court and the case was poured over to the Court of Appeals.

The matter was argued

before the Court of Appeals on August 21, 2008. The Court of Appeals issued its opinion
on December 26, 2008, reversing the District Court's judgment finding that a
constructive trust was established. Dwayne and Paulette now ask this Court to correct the
Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling on the reversal of the imposition of a constructive
trust.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Arnold J. Rawlings (Arnold) and Cleo Rawlings (Cleo) had five children who are,
in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (Donald), Arnold Dwayne Rawlings (Dwayne),
Theron LaRell Rawlings (LaRell), Bryce C. Rawlings (Bryce), and Carol Rawlings
Masterson (Carol). (Findings of Fact f 1). In 1944, Arnold purchased approximately
22.37 acres of property from his mother, Gertrude Rawlings, and obtained the deed to the
property (the "trust property"). (R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 31:19-25). Cleo has never had
title in the trust property. (Findings of Fact ^f 2). Arnold sold 12 acres of his
approximately 22.37 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres. (Findings of Fact ^|3).
Thereafter, Arnold and his family used the property to grow and sell produce and take
care of livestock. (R. 1587, Trans. Vol. I, 39:7-18).
In 1962, Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne
and spouse on which they built a home. (Findings of Fact ^4). In 1967 a very small piece
was deeded to Dwayne and spouse by Arnold between the properties where Arnold's
home was and where Dwayne and spouse built their home. Id. In 1960, Arnold deeded to
Donald and spouse a property slightly to the west of the property deeded to Dwayne. Id.
Donald built his home on that property. Id. In 1964, Arnold deeded property to Donald
adjacent to Donald's home which has been referred to as the barn property. Id. In 1967
Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse two parcels, one south of Dwayne's home ("the
garden") and the other south of the bam property ("the orchard"). Id.
In 1963, Arnold's remaining interest in the property ("the trust property") was
pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed (Findings of Fact ^J 5, Trial
3

Exhibit 8). In 1964, that indebtedness was rewritten as a conditional sales contract with
the pledge of a Ford truck and an Oldsmobile automobile. (Findings of Fact ^j 6). The
transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security.
(Findings of Fact ^7).
By October of 1966, Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately
required medical attention. (Findings of Fact ^f 8). Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald
talked to the Utah County Department of Public Welfare (Welfare Department) about his
intention to have his father transfer the trust property to him. (Findings of Fact ^ 9). That
intent was corroborated by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a
prior meeting, and providing proof of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of
the Walker Bank debt. (Findings of Fact ^ 9, Trial Exhibit 86). On December 22, 1966,
Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor, following which he labored
to recover from his illness. (Findings of Fact ^f 10). In January of 1967, Arnold began the
series of 20 cobalt treatments. (Findings of Fact Tf 11). The medical attention that Arnold
required was extremely expensive. Id. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the medical
treatment and received welfare assistance. Id. Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and
he was in very poor health in 1966 and 1967. (Findings of Fact ^|16; R. 1588 Trans. Vol.
II, 244:15-19, R. 1590 Trans. Vol. IV, 629:17-22, 632:14-15.) In March of 1967, Arnold
was somewhat advanced in age, had an eighth grade or less education, and was very
concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare Department. (Findings of
Fact fl6; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 48:21-24, 132:17-19, 225:11-20). The Welfare
Department would pay the majority of the medical expenses associated with Arnold's
4

illness if Arnold's property (other than his home) was not in his name. (Findings of Fact <[
14). He was advised by the Welfare Department to transfer the trust property out of his
name. (Trial Exhibit 68). Arnold told LaRell that Arnold needed to get the trust property
out of his name and suggested that he deed it to LaRell. (Findings of Fact ^}43, R. 1587
Trans. Vol. I, 48:13-19). LaRell testified that he didn't want the responsibility and
suggested that Arnold put the land in Dwayne's name because Dwayne would be the
most fair to the family. (Findings of Fact ^|44? R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 49:8-11). Arnold
indicated to LaRell that he thought LaRell's suggestion to put the land in Dwayne's name
was a good idea. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. 149:11-12).
However, Arnold later requested a meeting at a restaurant in Salt Lake with
Donald and LaRell. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I. 49:13-23). LaRell testified that Arnold met
him in the parking lot of the restaurant and informed him that "Donald's really upset"
"because he's the oldest, and he thinks [the trust property] should be put in his name." (R.
1587 Trans. Vol. I 49:24-25, 50:1-3). LaRell testified that Arnold then stated to LaRell
that putting the land in Donald's name was the "same deal" as when they had discussed
putting the land in Dwayne's name. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 50:5-10). LaRell understood
from Arnold that Arnold thought the trust property would come back to him when he got
i

better, and, if Arnold didn't recover, then it would first go to take care of Cleo and then to
the rest of the family. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 50:14-18). At the meeting between Donald,
Arnold, and LaRell, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald
because of the Welfare requirement for receiving assistance—Arnold did not mention the

5

Walker Bank debt as a reason for deeding the trust property to Donald. (Findings of Fact
^[45, 46, 47; R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 51:1-3).
In January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on
the trust property; Dwayne borrowed $1,000 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and
endorsed that check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which
Donald alleged were due on the trust property. (Findings of Fact f 50). Donald did not
deliver this $1000 to the Utah County Assessor for payment of real estate taxes until after
the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold. Id. One or two days before
March 24, 1967, the date the trust property was deeded, Donald and Arnold met with
Dwayne, and Arnold informed Dwayne that Arnold was deeding the trust property to
Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consistent with
other concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer
had anything to do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt. (Findings of
Fact 1J48). On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused a total of $1,267 ($1,000 of
which was paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust
property and on properties owned by Donald and spouse. (Findings of Fact ^f 52).
Dwayne testified that during a conversation with Donald present, Arnold disclosed to
Dwayne that he was putting the trust property in Donald's name to be held for the family
and divided later. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 336:1-2, 381: 8-15).
Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder
on March 24, 1967, Arnold deeded the trust property to Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of
Fact If 17, Trial Exhibit 12). Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal
6

description. Id. Although Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership
interest in the trust property, and there was no testimony given as to why she executed
any deed that was offered into evidence in this manner. Id. The same day, a quit-claim
deed ("the sibling deed") was signed by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol,
and Bryce in favor of Donald and Jeanette. (Findings of Fact f 19). Bryce testified that he
was told by Arnold before he signed the deed that the welfare treatments were the reason
the trust property needed to be transferred, and that the transfer was temporary—meaning
that the trust property would be returned to Arnold when Arnold got better. (R. 1588
Trans. Vol. II 225:11-20, 245:21-25). LaRell testified that when he went to sign the deed,
Arnold explicitly told him (without prompting) that the trust property was not Donald's;
it was the family's property. (R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I 60:9-12, Findings of Fact ^ 53).
Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of Carol,
Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject. (Findings of Fact ^f 54).
After the deeds were signed in March 1967, Arnold's routine in running the
farming and livestock operations on the trust property remained the same. (R. 1587
Trans. Vol. I 63:19-23; R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II 229:23-25; 281:11-21). Bryce testified that
his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald and spouse intending only to make
it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter their expected shares of the
trust property. (Findings of Fact ^f 57). Arnold continued to refer to the trust property as
"his," and he considered the trust property to be his up until the time of his death.
(Findings of Fact lj 56, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 233:24-25; 234:1; 253:1-22; 339:16-22).
After the signing of the deed, Arnold gave permission to Bryce to live on the trust
7

property and picked a spot for him to put his mobile home. (R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II,
235:18-21). In 1970, Arnold requested that the military discharge his son LaRell early so
that he could come help Arnold on the trust property. (Findings of Fact ^f 58). Several
letters addressed to the military from Arnold and various other individuals in the
community referred the trust property as Arnold's farm, with no mention of Donald
owning the trust property. (Findings of Fact Tf58, Trial Exhibits 19-29).
On March 1, 1971, Arnold died. (Findings of Fact 165). On March 30, 1971,
Arnold's widow paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which included all of the trust property.
(Findings of Fact f 67; Trial Transcript Vol. Ill 493: 20-25, 494:1-21; Trial Exhibits 58
and 59). After Arnold's death, most of the family members except Donald continued to
work on the trust property. (Findings of Fact 1J20, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 66:3-8); R. 1588
Trans. Vol. II, 254:8-10). When asked about who worked on the trust property, Donald
testified, "all I (Donald) know is that I didn't." (Findings of Fact Tj 20, 75).
After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the
income from the trust property was being used to support their widowed mother.
(Findings of Fact ^ 22, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 238:11-12). In 1974, the Vineyard
Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south boundary line of the trust
property (see Trial Exhibit 1). (Findings of Fact ^ 24, 70, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 401:12). As it was developed, fences were place in the backyards of the homes in Vineyard
Meadows Subdivision, generally near the south boundary line of the trust property.
Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon "Mother's
farm." Id. At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm,"
8

Dwayne and his son worked with Donald and his son to place a fence through the
backyards of the home owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for
"Mother's farm" was. Id. Dwayne regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saint ward with the people who lived in those homes. Id. He and his spouse were
friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed testimony is, in order to
assist in the protection of the trust property, Dwayne and his son placed fencing in those
yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was resolved. Donald
caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings (LaRell
refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. Id. This included
the purchase of a car. Id. As part of the Vineyard Meadows lawsuit, Donald persuaded
his siblings to sign a deed naming Donald and Jeanette as grantees, which Donald
explained contained a legal description only of the disputed area. (Findings of Fact ^ 25,
72, Trial Exhibit 30, R. 1587 Trans. Vol. I, 104:1-4). In fact, it contained a legal
description that included all of the trust property. (Findings of Fact ^|25, Trial Exhibit 30).
The Vineyard Meadows lawsuit was settled, and Donald gave some of the funds to his
siblings and used some to support his mother. (Findings of Fact ^f 24, 71). Donald then
co-mingled the remainder of the settlement money with his own money, along with the
trust property proceeds not used for his mother. (Finding of Fact f 76, R. 1589 Trans.
Vol III, 579:2-24). The testimony is undisputed that Donald is unable to distinguish any
funds which he spend at any time from March 24, 1967, to the day of trial as to their
source whether they came from the trust property income or from income from some
other source. (Findings of Fact f 76).
9

Until 1993, less than four (4) years before this suit was filed, the family members
believed that the trust property was held for the family and that Donald considered it to
be trust property until a conversation in which Donald told Dwayne that the land was his
(Donald's) property and that he wasn't compensating their mother for anything he used
from the property. (Findings of Fact f 74, R. 1588 Trans. Vol. II, 3556:12-20).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Evidence was presented at the trial court that Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust property from
Arnold to Donald and Jeanette. If by reason of kinship, business association, disparity in
age, or physical or mental condition or other reason, [one party] is in an especially
intimate position with regard to the [other], and the latter reposes a high degree of trust
and confidence in the former, the court may find that the relationship is technically
'confidential."' Hawkins v. Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953)(citations omitted). The
trial court found, through evidence presented at trial, the elements of a confidential
relationship between Donald and Arnold at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust
property Arnold and Donald's relationship meets not just one, but several of these
factors, including kinship, disparity in age, and inferior physical and mental condition of
the grantor (Arnold). Arnold did intend to convey legal title with the 1967 conveyance of
the trust property, although he did not intend to convey equitable title. Appellees, like the
Court of Appeals, rely on a single, out-of-context finding of fact by the trial court to
argue that Arnold did not intend to transfer the trust property at all. Individual findings of
fact by the district court should not be taken out of context but should be viewed in
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context with the case as a whole. Salt Lake City S. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Cornm'n, 1999
UT 90, P7 (Utah 1999). Both the evidence presented in the case and the other findings of
fact entered by the trial court show that the Arnold did intend to transfer mere legal title
to Donald and Jeanette, but he did not intend to transfer equitable title in the trust
property through the 1967 deed. A constructive trust is imposed based on the totality of
circumstances to prevent unjust enrichment and may be imposed without a finding of
intent to create a trust by the grantor. Restatement of Restitution §160, cmt. a; Parks v.
Zions First Nat flBank} 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983); Legault v. Legault, 459 A.2d 980,
984 (Vt. 1983). The trial court properly imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the
Rawlings family even without a finding of intent to create an express oral trust with the
1967 conveyance of the trust property from Arnold to Donald and Jeanette. The suit was
filed within the statute of limitations because of the discovery rule. "Statutes of
limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the
cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 33 (Utah 2002) (citing Burkholz v. Joyce,
972 P.2d 1235, 1236 (Utah 1998)). "In certain instances, however, the discovery rule tolls
the limitation period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered."
Id. Because of Donald and Jeanette's concealment and misleading conduct, the appellants
did not become aware of the cause of action until 1993 and the discovery rule applies.
Appellees had a duty to marshal the evidence on appeal. Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547
(Utah App. 1989). Because the evidence presented at trial shows the elements of a
confidential relationship, the evidence presented at trial shows the Arnold intended to
transfer mere legal title to Donald and Jeanette, the discovery rule tolled the statute of
11

limitations, and the appellees failed to marshal the evidence, the court should reverse the
Court of Appeals' decision and impose a constructive trust in favor of the appellants..
ARGUMENT
I. Evidence was presented at the trial court that Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust
property from Arnold to Donald and Jeanette.
Appellants presented evidence at trial that Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust property from
Arnold to Donald. A formal confidential relationship need not exist between the
transferor and transferee; the superiority of one party and dependence, trust and rehanee
of the other are the important factors in finding a confidential relationship. Hawkins v.
Perry, 253 P.2d 372, 376 (Utah 1953); Newell v. Halloran, 68 Utah 407, 414 (Utah
1926). Hawkins v. Perry is an example of a case where the court found that a constructive
trust was properly imposed upon land despite the lack of a formal confidential
relationship between the transferor and transferee. 253 P.2d at 377. The Hawkins court
reasoned that: "If by reason of kinship, business association, disparity in age, or physical
or mental condition or other reason, [one party] is in an especially intimate position with
regard to the [other], and the latter reposes a high degree of trust and confidence in the
former, the court may find that the relationship is technically 'confidential.'" Id. at 376
(citations omitted).
Although a parent-child relationship alone is not enough to create a confidential
relationship, "it is sufficient that there is a family relationship...of such a character that
12

the transferor is justified in believing that the transferee will act in his interest.95 Haws v.
Jensen, 209 P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1949); Bradbury v. Rasmussen, 401 P.2d 710, 713
(Utah 1965); Estate of Jones v. Jones, 759 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). This
type of relationship existed in Haws v. Jensen. In Haws, a mother ("Mrs. Haws")
executed a warranty deed in favor of her daughter ("Amber") but continued to live on
and use the property as her own until her death some years later. After the death of Mrs.
Haws, Amber and her husband resided on the property. After Amber's death, her
husband, as Amber's sole heir, declared himself the owner of the property. Amber's
siblings (and their heirs) brought suit, claiming that the warranty deed was intended to
create an oral trust with the land to be held for the benefit of the entire family. The
siblings did not expressly allege in their complaint that Amber and Mrs. Haws were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the transfer. Id. at 217-218. The trial court ruled
in favor of the siblings. Id. at 216. On appeal, Amber's husband's argued that this lack
of an allegation of a confidential relationship in the complaint would preclude the court
from properly imposing a constructive trust, the Court gave the following statement:
The defendant contends that there is no allegation of a confidential relation
between Amber and Mrs. Haws. True, it is not specifically alleged that
there was a confidential relation. However, in the complaint it is alleged
that Mrs. Haws conveyed the property to Amber intending that the latter
hold the property in trust for the benefit of the whole family. Implicit in this
allegation is that Mrs. Haws reposed confidence in Amber; otherwise, Mrs.
Haws would have not made the conveyance. Thus this allegation along with
the fact that the grantor and grantee were mother and daughter, which
appears on the face of the complaint, is a sufficient allegation of a
confidential relation.
Id.
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The Haws Court then held that the confidential relationship between the mother
and daughter was sufficient to create a constructive trust under Restatement (Second) of
Trusts §45 without written evidence, despite the fact that the deed was absolute on its
face, and despite the fact that no express allegation of a confidential relationship was
raised in the complaint. Id. at 224. In response to the defendant's allegations that the
siblings had failed to prove by clear, unequivocal, and conclusive evidence that Amber
took the property subject to the condition that she hold and use it for her mother's heirs,
the Court responded that it would not set aside the trial court's findings on conflicting
evidence unless the findings clearly weighed against the evidence or the trial court
misapplied proven facts. Id. at 218-219.
The trial court found, through evidence presented at trial, the elements of a
confidential relationship between Donald and Arnold at the time of the 1967 conveyance
of the trust property. Arnold and Donald's relationship meets not just one, but several of
the factors of a confidential relationship described in the Hawkins case, including kinship,
disparity in age, and inferior physical and mental condition of the grantor (Arnold). At
the time of the conveyance, Arnold was a sick man undergoing brutal treatments for his
cancer. He had only an eighth grade education and was deeply concerned about losing the
trust property as a result of his illness and the effect that loss would have on his wife and
children. Although Arnold first discussed putting the property in LaRell and Dwayne's
name, he acquiesced to Donald's request to have the property put in Donald and
Jeaneatte's name. When Donald discussed with his ailing and distressed father a solution
to Arnold's problem—which involved conveying mere fee title to the trust property to
14

Donald and Jeanette so that they could be responsible for taking care of the trust property
for the family and their father—it was natural for Arnold to trust Donald, Arnold's and
Cleo's oldest child. That Arnold depended upon Donald is evidenced by the fact that
Donald, and not Arnold, was communicating with the Welfare Department to determine
how best to effect the transfer of title. At this point, Arnold believed, and was justified in
believing, that the transferee, Donald, would act in Arnold's best interest. Arnold and
Donald's relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance was clearly a confidential
relationship.
The appellees cite Nielson v. Rasmussen in support of their proposition that the
trial court could not impose a constructive trust under Restatement Second of Trusts §451
without an express statement by the trial court that Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust property. 558
P.2d 511, 513 (Utah 1976). In Nielson v. Rasmussen, the trial court had expressly found
against the creation of a constructive trust and specifically found that the "relationship
between plaintiffs and defendants was that of seller and buyer of real estate without prior
1

The Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1) reads as follows:
Where the owner of an interest in land transfers it inter vivos to another in trust
for a third person, but no memorandum property evidencing the intention to
create a trust is signed, as required by the Statute of Frauds, and the transferee
refuses to perform the trust, the transferee holds the interest upon a constructive
trust for the third person, if, but only if...
b) The transferee at the time of the transfer was in a confidential relation to the
transferor, or

Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45(1).
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dealings/' and "that no confidential relationship existed between plaintiffs and
defendants...5' Id. The court in Nielson was not willing to impose a constructive trust
when the trial court had found that none could be imposed and that the plaintiff and
defendant were in a relationship of seller and buyer and had not had prior dealings. Id. at
513. In contrast, the trial court in the Rawlings case did impose a constructive trust, and,
as shown above, factually found all the elements of a confidential relationship under Utah
law. Thus, because the trial court did find evidence that Arnold and Donald were in a
confidential relationship at the time of the 1967 conveyance of the trust property, the trial
court was correct in its imposition of a constructive trust.
II. Arnold did intend to convey legal title with the 1967 conveyance of the trust
property, although he did not intend to convey equitable title.
Arnold intended to convey mere legal title to the trust property by the 1967 deed,
but he did not intend to convey equitable title. Appellees, like Ihe Court of Appeals, rely
on a single, out-of-context finding of fact by the trial court to argue that Arnold did not
intend to transfer the trust property at all. Individual findings of fact by the district court
should not be taken out of context but should be viewed in context with the case as a
whole. Salt Lake City S R.R. Co. v. State Tax Cornm'n, 1999 UT 90, P7 (Utah 1999);
Covey v. Covey, 80 P.3d 553, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1567-1568 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In
Covey v. Covey, a brother appealed a judgment in a suit brought against him by his sister
for a breach of contract. Covey, 80 P.3d at 555. The brother challenged the validity and
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consistency of three findings of fact by the lower court. Id. The Court affirmed the
consistency of the findings of fact and reproved the brother for taking the findings of
facts out of context. Id.
Similarly, in the Minnesota Mining case, a man disputed the findings of fact in a
patent suit. Minnesota Mining 976 F.2d at 1567-1568. The man alleged that some of the
findings of fact actually supported his position, which was contrary to the lower court's
holding. Id. The Court agreed that when taken out of context the findings did appear to
support his arguments, but rejected his reasoning, stating, "However, when the findings
are reviewed in context, their meaning is clear." Id.
The Court of Appeals, like the appellants in the Covey and Minnesota Mining
cases, took one finding of fact out of context and used it to support a premise contrary to
its original meaning. The Court of Appeals stated in its opinion that the finding that
"Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the
farm," meant that "Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm at all . . ." Rawlings v.
Rawlings, 2008 UT App 478, P 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 2008).
The other findings of fact, the undisputed testimony of witnesses, and other
evidence at trial all demonstrate that Arnold clearly intended to transfer mere legal title in
the trust property to Donald and Jeanette with the 1967 deed. This intent was evidenced
by Arnold's numerous conversations with his children announcing his intent to transfer
legal title in the trust property, the deed itself, and the correspondence between the
Welfare Department and Donald about the intended transfer. Using the finding of fact in
question, the district court attempted to clarify that Arnold did not intend to transfer
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equitable title to the property to Donald and Jeanette when he deeded the trust property to
them in 1967.
Arnold's actions demonstrate that he believed that he still held equitable title to
the land even after signing the 1967 deed. Arnold continued to refer to the trust property
as "his" property in his written and oral communication until he died. Arnold had
conversations with LaRell, Bryce, and Dwayne about the trust property being the "family
farm/' and indicated that Arnold expected the trust property would later be reconveyed to
him or divided among the family fairly. In addition, Arnold and his wife continued use
the land in the same manner as before they transferred legal title to Donald and Jeanette.
Both the evidence presented in the case and the other findings of fact entered by
the trial court show that the Arnold did intend to transfer mere legal title to Donald and
Jeanette, but he did not intend to transfer equitable title in the trust property through the
1967 deed. Because Arnold's actions, the evidence presented at trial, and the other
findings of fact show that Arnold intended for Donald to hold the property for him in
trust, the Court should uphold the district court's imposition of a constructive trust.
III.

The trial court properly imposed a constructive trust for the benefit of the
Rawlings family.

The appellees argue that, even if the court found that Arnold transferred the
property in trust, the siblings in the family could in no way benefit from that trust. In a
helpful case with remarkably similar facts (recited earlier), the Haws court imposed a
constructive trust for the benefit of siblings and their heirs. Like the mother in the Haws
case, Arnold executed a warranty deed to Donald and Jeanette, giving them legal title to
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hold the property for the benefit of the entire family. This is evidenced by testimony from
the siblings that Arnold indicated to them that the property was to be held for the benefit
of the entire family and also by Arnold's statements to LaRell at the execution of the
deed that the property was not Donald's property—it was the family's property. Like
Mrs. Haws, Arnold continued to live on and use the property as his own until his death.
As discussed earlier, Arnold and Donald were in a confidential relationship at the time of
the transfer. The trial court's imposition of a constructive trust for the benefit of the entire
Rawlings family was correct according to Utah law and the principles of equity.
IV.

A constructive trust could be properly imposed by the court even without a
finding of intent to create an express oral trust with the 1967 conveyance of
the trust property from Arnold to Donald and Jeanette.
Appellees allege that, without the finding of intent to create an express oral trust,

Donald and Jeanette are not unjustly enriched and a constructive trust cannot be imposed.
Although the appellants affirmatively allege that Arnold did have the intent to transfer the
property and create an oral trust, the court could properly impose a constructive trust
even without this intent.
A constructive trust, unlike other types of trusts, does not require a manifestation
of intent to create a trust and may be imposed by law regardless of the intention of the
parties. Restatement of Restitution §160, cmt. a; Parks v. Zions First Natl Bank, 673 P.2d
590, 598 (Utah 1983); Wells Fargo Bank American Trust Co. v. Greuner, 226 Cal. App.
2d 454, 460 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1964); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009). In
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Parks v. Zions First National Bank, the court imposed a constructive trust contrary to the
intent of the grantor. 673 P.2d 590, 598 (Utah 1983).
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy to prevent unjust enrichment, and the
court has broad discretion in how it applies this remedy; the court is "bound by no
unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each
transaction wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property would result in unjust
enrichment." Haws 209 P.2d at 232 (quoting 3 Bogert on Trusts and Trustees, Part 1,
1946 Ed., §471); Restatement of Restitution §160; Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673
P.2d 590, 599 (Utah 1983); Carnesecca v. Carnesecca, 572 P.2d 708 (Utah 1977);
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).When
determining whether a constructive trust is the proper equitable remedy, the totality of
circumstances and setting will be taken into account. Legault v. Legault, 459 A.2d 980,
984 (Vt. 1983); Savage v. Walker, 2009 VT 8, P8 (Vt. 2009); McGrath v. Hilding, 41
N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331, 394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1977). In Legault v.
Legault, a court imposed a constructive trust because the totality of circumstances
showed that unjust enrichment would occur if a constructive trust were not imposed.
Legault 459 A.2d at 984. A father sought to recover money from his foster daughter
through the imposition of a constructive trust. Id. at 982. The father had, through the
thirty-four years of his marriage, turned his paycheck over to his wife each week for her
to pay the bills and deposit the money in their joint account. Id. After the wife's death,
the father found that the alleged joint account his wife had told him she was depositing
the money in never existed. Id. Instead, the wife was depositing the money into a joint
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account for her and her foster daughter. Id. The court imposed a constructive trust on the
money in the account in favor of the father, finding that it would be inequitable for the
foster daughter to retain the money. Id. at 984. The court counseled that, when dealing
with constructive trusts and equitable remedies, courts should examine the totality of the
circumstances regarding the situation, and not limit the inquiry to one transaction:
[WJhether there is unjust enrichment may not be determined from a limited inquiry confined to
an isolated transaction. It must be a realistic determination based on a broad view of the human
setting involved." Id. at 984 (citations omitted).
Looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conveyance from
Arnold to Donald, the court should conclude that Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly
enriched if they were allowed to become the owners of the trust property in their personal
capacities and to keep the proceeds from the trust property without the imposition of a
constructive trust. The success of the Rawlings trust property was a direct result of the
combined industry of the whole family. Testimony from Donald and the other siblings is
that everyone except Donald worked on the trust property in the years following the 1967
conveyance while Arnold was alive and after his death. In addition, the record shows that
Donald received help from his family to put up fences during the Vineyard Meadows
dispute, which aided Donald in reaching a settlement agreement. Donald and Jeanette,
who co-mingled the proceeds from the operation of the trust property—including
proceeds from the settlement agreement—with their own money, would be unjustly
enriched without the imposition of a constructive trust. Arnold's widow paid back taxes
on the land even after the 1967 conveyance, and Arnold continued to use and treat the
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land as his own, taking responsibility for the care and maintenance of the trust property
without Donald's help, and without compensation from Donald. Indeed, the proceeds
from the trust property were used for the support of Arnold's widow, Cleo, and Donald
represented to the other members of the family when he asked for the quit claim deeds in
1974 that he needed their help to save their mother's farm.
Even if the court accepts the Court of Appeals' reasoning that "Arnold did not
intend to transfer the farm at all," then Donald is still unjustly enriched. If Arnold did not
intend to transfer the trust property to Donald then, after numerous years of watching his
family perform work on the trust property knowing that they believed that the work they
were doing was for a farm in which they all had an interest (and expressing to them that
the trust property and its proceeds were to help their widowed mother) but performing no
work himself, Donald claims the property and all the proceeds for himself, he is unjustly
enriched, and the court may impose a constructive trust regardless of the parties' intent.
Regardless of Arnold's intent to create a trust at the time of the 1967 conveyance,
Donald and Jeanette would be unjustly enriched if they were allowed to retain title to the
trust property without the imposition of a constructive trust. This Court should reverse the
Court of Appeals' decision and impose a constructive trust on the trust property.
V. The suit was filed within the statute of limitations because of the discovery rule.
The Court did not err in finding that the claim for a constructive trust was not
barred by the statute of limitations. Statutes of limitations are questions of law. "Statutes
of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete
the cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, 33 (citing Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d
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1235, 1236 (Utah 1998)). "In certain instances, however, the discovery rule tolls the
limitation period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered." Id.
There discovery rule applies, "in situations where a plaintiff does not become aware of
the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct."
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)(citations omitted).
The appellants were unaware that Donald was not holding the property in trust for
the family until a conversation between Dwayne and Donald where Donald in 1993 in
which Donald told Dwayne that the trust property was his (Donald's) property and that he
wasn't compensating their mother for anything he used from the trust property. Because
of Donald and Jeanette's concealment and misleading conduct, the appellants did not
become aware of the cause of action until 1993 and the discovery rule applies.
VL

Standard of Review
This court gave a succinct description of the appropriate standard of review in the

case of United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.:
A trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness
standard; we afford no degree of deference to a trial judge's determination
of the law. A trial court's findings of fact will be upheld unless they are
clearly erroneous. Although legal questions are reviewed for correctness,
we "may still grant a trial court discretion in its application of the law to a
given fact situation." We decide how much discretion to give a trial court in
applying the law to a particular area by considering a number of factors
"pertinent to the relative expertise of appellate and trial courts in addressing
those issues." Finally, "a trial court is accorded considerable latitude and
discretion in applying and formulating an equitable remedy," and will not
be overturned unless it abused its discretion.
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 79 P.3d 945, 948 (Utah
2003)(citations omitted).
23

VII. Appellees had a duty to marshal the evidence, which they failed to do.
Appellees failed to marshal the evidence during their appeal to the lower court:
"The challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial which tends
to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings are clearly erroneous". Bell v.
Elder, 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah App. 1989); West Valley City v. Majestic Investment
Company, 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (UtahCt. App. 1991).
In West Valley City, Judge Orme held, "[A]fter marshaling the evidence
supporting the trial court's findings, the City must then show that these same findings are
'so lacking in support as to be' 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making
them clearly erroneous." 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted).
West Valley City had presented the Court of Appeals with a brief that contained extensive
quotes from the record. The Court found this an inadequate marshaling and explained,
"In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the challenger must
present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After
constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to convince the
appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous."
West Valley City, 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (citations omitted).
Appellees have not marshaled the evidence. The Appellees argue that the
Appellants failed to offer any evidence that a confidential relationship existed between
the grantor, Arnold J. Rawlings (Appellants) and grantees. The Appellees do not,
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however address the Appellants' argument and evidence and then ferret out flaws in the
same argument and evidence, showing against the clear weight of the evidence why it is
clearly erroneous. This review of the findings of fact is controlled by rule 52(a) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." The Supreme
Court of Utah in Cornish Town v. Roller, 758 P.2d 919, (UT 1988) said, "To mount a
successful challenge to trial court findings under that rule, an appellant must marshal the
evidence supporting the trial court's findings. Only then can we determine whether those
findings are clearly erroneous." Id at 922. When an appellant fails to do this "the trial
court's determination will not be disturbed." Id. Because the appellants failed to marshal
the evidence in the lower court, this court should reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and uphold the trial court's imposition of a constructive trust.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court should hold that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the district court's imposition of a constructive trust.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^O^day

of July, 2009.

ROBINSON, SEILER & ANDERSON, LC

\r^L,.J+).

^L^U

THOMAS W. SEILER
Attorney for Appellants
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Fourth Judicial District Court
ef Utah County, State of Ulah
M. DAYL6 JEFFS, #1655
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C
Attorneys for Third-Party Plainli ffs
Theron LaRoll Rawlings, Bryce C- Rawlings,
and Carol Lynn R. Mastcrson
90 North 100 East
P O. Box 888
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (SOI) 373-SS4S
Facsimile: (801)373-8878
THOMAS W. SE1LER, #2910
ROBTNSON, SEILER, & ANDERSON, LC
Attorneys for Defendants and Third-Party Plaintiffs
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings
2500 North. University Avenue
P.O. Box 1266
Provo, Utah 84603-1266
Telephone: (801) 375-1920
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 970400260
Division No. 9

vs.
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.
THERON LARELL RAWLTNGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLTNGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs
vs.

DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is
unknown,
Third Party Defendants.

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of
evidence and by agreement, each, ofthe parties submitted a Post-Trial Ivl emorandum marshaling their
arguments regarding die evidence and die law on the issue. Having considered the parties'
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered its ruling
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on the bifurcated issue, the Court now makes and enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on the issue of constructive trust:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Arnold J. Rawlings (hereinafter ^Arnold") and Cleo Rawlings (hereinafter "Cleos>)

had five children who are, in order of birth, Donald Rawlings (hereinafter "Donald"), Arnold
Dwayne Rawlings (hereinafter "Dwayne"). Theron LaRell Rawlings (hereinafter "LaRell71), Bryce
C. Rawlings (hereinafter "Bryce"), and Carol Lynn Rawlings Mastcrson (hereinafter "Carol"),
2.

Arnold Rawlmgs acquired the property from his mother in 1944. From that time until

the time of his death, his wife Cleo's name was not on the title to the properly at issue in this case.
Clco has no ownership interest in the farm property,
3.

Arnold solely owned approximately 22.37 acres of property in Oram. Arnold sold

12 acres, leaving approximately 10.37 acres.
4.

Tn 1962 Arnold deeded property roughly adjacent to Arnold's home to Dwayne

Rawlings and spouse on which they built a home. Tn 1967 a very small piece was deeded to Dwayne
and spouse by Arnold between the property where Arnold's home was and where Dwayne and
spouse built there home. In 1960 Arnold deeded to Donald and spouse aproperty slightly to the west
of the property deeded io Dwayne. Donald built his home on that property. Adjacent to the home
on which Donald built bis home, Arnold deeded in 1964 property to Donald which has been referred
to as the barn property, in 1967 Arnold deeded to Dwayne and spouse rwo parcels, one south of
Dwayne's home ("the garden") and the other south of the barn property ("the orchard"7).
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5.

In 1963 the farm was pledged to Walker Bank and Trust Company on a Trust Deed.

(Exhibit S)
6.

hi 1964 that indebtedness was rewritten as a Conditional Sales Contract with the

pledge of a Ford trust and an Oldsmobile automobile.
7.

The transaction consisted of a rewriting of the loan with the replacement of security.

8.

By October of 19667 Arnold had been diagnosed with cancer which ultimately

required medical attention.
9.

Prior to December 16, 1966, Donald Rawlings talked to the Welfare Department

about his intention to have his father transfer the farm property to him. That intent was corroborated
by Exhibit 68, a letter from the Welfare Department referring to a prior meeting, and provides proff
of the intent to transfer before the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt.
10.

On December 22,2006, Arnold was operated on to remove a large cancerous tumor,

following which he labored to recover from his illness.
11.

in January of 1967, Arnold began a series of 20 cobalt treatments. The medical

attention that Arnold required was extremely expensive. Arnold lacked resources to pay for the
medical treatment and received welfare assistance.
12.

Donald Rawlings discussed his intention to transfer Arnold's property into Donald's

name (see Exhibit 8, a letter dated December 16,1966, from the Utah County Department of Public
Welfare to Donald Rawlings).
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13.

The letter from the Welfare Department was addressed to Donald, not to Arnold or

Cleo, the persons receiving the benefits from the Welfare Department pertaining to his illness.
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The Utah County Department of Public Welfare (hereinafter "Welfare Department")

would pay the majority of themedical expenses associated with Arnold's illness if Arnold's property
was not m his name (other than Arnold's home).
15.

Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital for additional medical treatment on

February 16, 1967. Arnold was admitted to the Utah Valley Hospital agam for yet more medical
treatment on March 14, 1967.
16.

The undisputed testimony is that Arnold's health steadily deteriorated, and he was

in very poor health on March 24,1967. He was somewhat advanced in age. He had an eighth grade
or less education and was very concerned that the trust property would be lost to the Welfare
Department.
17.

Pursuant to a Warranty Deed dated and recorded with the Utah County Recorder on

March 24,1967 7 Arnold deeded the property referred to as the farm property or the trust property to
Donald and spouse. Exhibit 12 is a copy of the deed and a plat of the legal description. Although
Cleo's signature appears thereon, Cleo had no ownership interest in the trust property, and there was
no testimony given as to why she executed any deed that was offered into evidence in this matter
18.

On March 24,1967, Arnold conveyed by Warranty Deed three parcels to D wayne and

spouse. This deed, with plats as to each of the three parcels, was admitted as Exhibits 14, 15, and
16. The undisputed testimony was that parcel I was a small portion between Arnold's homes and
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Dwayne's home which Arnold had sometime earlier sold to Dwayne and spouse. Further, the
undisputed testimony was that parcel 2 on Exiiibits 14, 15, and 16 has been continuously held by
Dwayne as part of the constructive trust property for and on behalf of the family members to be
distributed as the Court orders.
19.

On March 24,1967, a Quit-Claim Deed (liereinafter Ctthe sibling deed55) was signed

by Dwayne and spouse, LaRell and spouse, Carol, and Bryce and spouse to Donald and spouse. This
sibling deed contained a legal description for the trust property. Overtime, small neighboring pieces
of property were added to the trust property in various deeds signed by Donald's siblings and most
sibling spouses.
20.

The undisputed testimony is that the operation of the trust property or the family farm

continued exactly the same before and after March 24, 1967, except that, because of Arnold's
weakened physical cond ition, sometimes he could do very li tt!e work. Donald also testified on cross
examination, when confronted with his deposition testimony, that although Arnold would go down
to the property and Dwayne, Bryce, and LaRell helped on the property "all f (Donald) know is that
J didn't"
21.

On cross examination Donald also admitted, when confronted with Ms deposition

testimony, that Arnold continued to have property until 1970.
22.

After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that income

from the trust property was being used to support their mother.
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23.

Both before and after March 24, 1967, and both before and after Arnold's death,

Donald's siblings, sometimes their spouses and somecimes their children, worked in the orchard on
the trust property, the work done after Arnold's death was with the understanding that the income
was to be used to support Cleo.
24.

In 1974, the Vineyard Meadows Subdivision was developed adjacent to the south

boundary line of the trust property (see Exhibit 1). As it was developed, fences were placed in the
backyards of the homes in Vineyard Meadows Subdivision, generally along the south boundary line
of the trust property. Donald told Dwayne that the fences in those backyards encroached upon
"Mother's farm.-" At Donald's request, and for the purpose of protecting "Mother's farm," Dwayne
and his son worked with Donald and Ms son to place a fence through the backyards of the home
owners in that subdivision to show where the boundary line for "Mothers farm" was. Dwayne
regularly attended his Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Samt ward with the people who lived in
those homes. He and hi$ spouse were friends with those home owners. Nevertheless, the undisputed
testimony is, in order to assist in the protection of the family farm or trust property, Dwayne and his
son placed fencing in those yards. Ultimately, the litigation surrounding the boundary dispute was
resolved. Donald caused some of the funds from the settlements to be delivered to his siblings
(LaRell refused the portion offered to him) and to be used for Cleo's support. This included the
purchase of a car,
25.

As part of this boundary dispute with Vineyard Meadows Subdivision home owners,

Donald convinced his siblings to sign another deed in 1974, which he explained to diem contained
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a legal description only of the disputed area. The deed named Donald and spouse as grantees. In
fact, it contained a much larger legal description that included all of the trust property. If, in fact,
Donald and spouse had owned the property before, no such deed would have been necessary.
26.

In April of 1978, Donald and spouse deeded a lA interest in a portion of the trust

property to Dwayne and spouse. This property appears as Exhibit 1 as the Pinegar property. The
Pinegar property was then deeded as part of a 1031 exchange to Mr. and Mrs, Jack Hadley and Mr.
and Mrs. Merrill Gappmayer. Out of that exchange, Donald and spouse and Dwayne and spouse
were deeded property located on Mountain Way Drive and 400 South in Orem, which was referred
to throughout the Trial as the industrial property The Pinegar property was credited as a 1/3 down
payment, or $15,000.00 of the $45,000,00 purchase price of the industrial property. The balance of
the purchase price was paid for, $15,000.00 by Donald md spouse and $15,000.00 by Dwayne and
spouse through loans obtained by the respective parties.
27.

Donald and Jeanette assert that they paid $579.06 to Walker Bank on December 29,

2966, upon which the bank surrendered its conditional sales contract. (Exhibit 0)
28,

The conditional sales contract was stamped "paid."

29,

The conditional contract shows that it was a stamped "paid" on December 15,1966

altered by ink to show a date of December 29,1966.
30

By the terras of the conditional sales constract, the bank's remedy was a recourse to

the automobile company under a full recourse clause.
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31.

In addition, the bank had a security interest in the Ford truck and Oldsmobile which

could have been foreclosed and taken in satisfaction of the remaining debt. Tf a foreclosure of the
trust deed was imminent, the bank would have had to record a Notice of Default and wait 90 days
to for the debtors to cure the default before the Notice of Sale could have been published. No such
recording was ever produced and is not a record in the Utah County Recorder's Office.
32.

No evidence was presented that the check for $579,06 was the required loan payoff

amount.
33.

Jcanette (Donald's spouse) testified that she and Donald had indebtedness with

Walker Bank and Trust Company for the building of their home at the same time period.
34.

In 1966 and 1967, Donald and spouse had loans with the Walker Bank. Commencing

June 29, 1966, Donald and spouse made the following payments, by check, to Walker Bank:

i

DATE

AMOUNT

June 29, 1966

$150.00 |

July 19,2966

100.00

August 10, 1966

100.00

September 21, 1966

100.00

October 19, 1966

100.00

November 21, 1966

100.00

December 29, 1966

579.06
$1,229.06

|TOTAL
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3 5.

Donald and Jeanette3 s banking records offered into evidence during the tn al revealed

no other payments to Walker Bank daring the time frame, in spite of imcontro verted testimony of
Jeanette Rawlings, that Donald and spouse had other loans upon which payments would have been
made with Walker Bank and trust during that time frame.
3 6.

Jeanette also testified that the bank gave her a reconveyance on the trust deed (Exhibit

9) at the same time. That testimony, however, is unpersuasive.
37.

The deeding of the tiTistpropertytoDonaldandJeanetteoccurred onMarch24,1967,

some three months after the alleged payment of the Walker Bank debt by Plaintiffs.
38.

After the litigation commenced, Donald's spouse, Jeannette Rawlings, altered the

checks evidencing the above payments, by adding language on each of them to indicate they were
paid to Walker Bank and Trust Company for and on behalf of Arnold Rawlings It was only during
the May 9? 2005 deposition of Jeannette Rawlings (Donald's spouse) thai she admitted to the
alteration of the documentary evidence, by notations made after this suit was filed, for the purpose
of designating those checks as checks paid on Arnold Rawlings3 account,
39.

Noting those circumstances, the Court is impersuadcd that the Plaintiffs9 assertions

regarding the December 29, 1966, check and concludes the Plaintiffs5 statements are not supported
by the records and the evidence.
40.

The Court is nnpersuaded that the farm was deeded by the parties' father to Donald

and Jeanette because of the payment of the alleged indebtedness.
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41.

During trial, neither Donald nor Jeanette testified the reason for the deed was because

they had paid off the loan.
42.

No testimony was presented of any agreement between Donald and his father that the

farm was deeded because of payment of the indebtedness,
43.

LaRell Rawlings testified that in late February or early March that his father had a

conversation with him in which Arnold suggested he needed to get the property out of Arnold's
name because of the Welfare Department's requirement that it be transferred out of his name.
44.

LaRell suggested it be placed in Dwayne's name as he would be most fair with the

45.

At a later meeting in Salt Lake City at a restaurant with both Donald and Arnold

family.

present, Arnold indicated that he was going to deed the property to Donald because of the Welfare
requirement for receiving assistance.
46.

That conversation (see Paragraph 45) was in the presence of Donald, was undisputed

by Donald at trial, and remains uncontradicted and unrebutted.
47.

No mention was made in that conversation of any payment of the Walker Bank debt

or any reason for deeding the property because of the Walker Bank debt.
48.

Oneortwo days before Mary 24,19673 the date the trust property was deeded, Donald

and Arnold met with Dwayne Rawlings and informed him that they were deeding the trust property
to Donald because Arnold needed to get the trust property out of his name, consislenl with other
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concerns regarding welfare assistance, but no mention was made that such transfer had anything to
do with any payment of the Walker Bank and Trust debt
49.

No where in this proceeding have Donald or Jeanette testified disputing that the

testimony of Dwayne to the meeting two days before the conveyance of the trust property.
50,

Li January of 1967, Donald told Dwayne that Arnold needed money for taxes on the

taist property, Dwayne borrowed $1,000.00 from the credit union at Geneva Steel and endorsed that
check to Donald for the purpose of making payments on the taxes which Donald alleged were due
on the trust property. Donald did not deliver this $1,000.00 to the Utah County Assessor for
payment of real estate taxes until after the trust property was conveyed to Donald and spouse to hold.
51.

If the March 24, 1967, deed had been intended to transfer ownership to Donald for

the payment of the Wailcer Bank debt in December of 1966, Arnold would not have been concerned
about paying the back taxes, as it would be Donald's responsibility.
52,

On March 24, 1967, Donald and spouse caused SI ,267,00 ($1,000.00 of which was

paid by Dwayne) to be paid to the Utah County Assessor's Office on the trust property and on other
properties owned by Donald and spouse.
53,

It is unrebutted that Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne were ail told that the March

24,1967, conveyance to Donald and spouse was because Arnold had to get the property out of his
name as required by the Welfare Department,
54.

Plaintiffs did not produce any persuasive testimony contradicting the testimony of

Carol, Bryce, LaRell, and Dwayne on that subject
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55.

There has "been inadequate explanation by Donald and spouse as to why the siblings

and their spouses, with the exception of Carol's husband, were asked 10 sign the March 2471967
Quit-Claim Deed, Exhibit 12.
56.

Alter March 24, 1967, deed, Arnold continued to treat the farm as his own.

57.

Bryce Rawlings testified that his father signed the March 24, 1967, deed to Donald

and spouse intending only to make it a temporary transfer, with the children to receive thereafter
their expected shares of the farm,
58.

In February of 1970, LaRell was in the military. Arnold asked that the military

release or discharge LaRell early to help on Arnold's farm, the trust property. Tn that regard, the
Com! admitted the following into evidence:
a.

Exhibit 22, a letter from Kent Stewart of the Utah State Department of

Highways, which stated in part:
u

With LaRell7 s brothers either unable or unwilling to help their father with his farm,
the future would be very precarious for him financially... In my opinion the only
way Arnold Rawlings could operate his farm is with the full time help of Ms son,
LaRell..."
b.

Exhibit 23, a letter dated February 18, 1970, addressed to the commanding

officer of Dugway Proving Grounds and signed by Darryl M. Williams, MD. The letter first explains
that Arnold has had a diagnosis of lymphosarcoma and states: 'Mr. Rawlings complains of
generalized symptoms that apparently prevent him from carrying on his normal work as a farmer."
Doctor Williams goes on the state that Arnold "does at the present time have evidence of
active disease; the prognosis in this instance must be considered guarded/'
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c.

Exhibit 24, a letter from Dr. Watson L. Lafferty dated February 16, 1970,

states, in part:
"Mr Rawtings has been under my care for one year, with a cronic [sic] health
condition and is unable to do his farming Due to Ms inability to do the hard labor
which is necessary to operate his farm the need for his son is very urgent."
d.

Exhibit 25 is a letter dated February 16, 1970 and signed by the Honorable

Merrill L. Hermansen, Third Distiict Juvenile Court, State of Utah. Judge Hermansen explains that
he became acquainted with Arnold's medical condition because Arnold and Judge Hermansen were
confined in Utah Valley Hospital at the same time. Judge Hermansen goes on to slate:
"I am aware that he is disabled with cancer and that he has as his only means of
support the operation of a small farm also located in the Orem area. Hjs illness
makes it impossible for him to operate this farm, and it is almost his only income,
I would therefore recommend that a hardship discharge be granted to Therin [sic]
LaRell Rawlings in order that he may take care of this urgent Family problem, to wit:
that of the support of his mother and father.'*
e

A letter dated February 10,1970 addressed to the U.S. Army and written to

Leo G. Meredith, manager of Chipman's Mercantile Company in American Fork, Utah- Mr.
Meredith states:
"[LaRell] and [Arnold]...have operated together in a project of raising fruit, together
with pleasure horses for sale. The Father is working under a handicap of a health
problem to a point where he is unable to do any of the work connected with breaking
and training the horses for sale, nor is he able to do any of the heavy work related to
the production of the fruit and the sale of thereof."
f.

Exhibit 27 is a sworn statement of Glen Merrill dated February 20, 1970.

Therein he states:
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"[Arnold] is unable to take care of Ms orchard and small farm. [Arnold] has no one
who is tree to help him He has a single son, LaP^ell, who lived with his mother and
father and attend to these necessary ditties but is now in the Army stationed at
Dugway, Utah,
"I believe it wonld be better for all concerned if LaRell could be released to again
look after the welfare of his aging and sick parents. This is a hardship case.7'
g.

Exhibit28 is a letter from the Honorable Noal IT. Wootton. Mr, Wootton was

an attorney who practice for many years in Utah County but who passed away m 2006, Mr, Wootton
malccs the following affirmative representations to the commanding officer of Dugway Proving
Grounds:
(1) He represents Arnold.
(2) Arnold is disabled with cancer.
(3) Arnold's sole source of support is a 10-acre farm which he operates.
(4) Without the aid of LaRell, Arnold and Cleo are going to suffer extreme
hardships.
1L

Exhibit 29 is a letter dated January 14, 1970, from Ray E. Gammon, Mr.

Gammon was a long-time attorney in Utah County who is now retired. Mr. Gammon makes the
following affirmative representations:
(1) He has known LaReil and his family for the past several years.
(2) LaRell has taken care of the family orchard.
(3) Arnold has been and is receiving treatment for cancer.
(4) Arnold is unable to care for the farm.
15

58,

hi addition to doctors, lawyers, a judge, and businessmen, Arnold, himself, executed

not one but two affidavits.
a.

Exhibit 19 is an affidavit executed by Arnold dated February 13,1970. hi the

February 13, 1970 affidavit, Arnold swears:
"that he his engaged as a farmer, Livestock Raiser, and for many years has been
dependent upoii his son, Theron LaRell Rawlings, to assist him in the operation of
his iarni."
'That the undersigned is 64 years of age and is severely afflicted with cancer and is
able to do but little of the work required for the operation of his farm, and he is badly
in need of the services of said son to assist him in the planting, cultivating, irrigating,
and harvesting of his crops and in caring for his livestock."
b.

Exhibit 20 is Arnold's second affidavit. In that affidavit Arnold swears thai;
(1) He has health problems which makes it impossible to do the hard labor

required by the farm.
(2) Last fall he lost several hundred bushels of pears because he could not get
them picked and to market in time.
(3) That he has three other boys living in the area, but that he had not been
getting any help from them.
(4) That LaRell had stayed at home and helped since his illness a few years
ago, and that LaRell was the only one he could turn to at that time.
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59.

The letters referred to in paragraph 57 and the affidavits of Arnold Rawlings

(paragraph 58) make it clear that the farm was still Arnold's, The only purpose for deeding the farm
into Donald's name could have been for protection against the Welfare Department,
60.

Exhibits 52 and 57 are Arnold5 s medical records for December 1966 through March

187 1969. The medical records note that on February 16, 1967, shortly before the execution of the
deeds which create the constructive trust in this matter, that Arnold was admitted to the hospital
because of his inability to care for himself at home. Arnold had presented an immediate distress
from an abscessed area of his right groin.
6L

The medical records make it clear that after the December 22,1966 surgery, Arnold

underwent approximately 20 treatments of high energy radiotherapy (cobalt 60) and that the dosage
administered was approximately 400 RAD (TD). They go on to say:
"Subsequently, the patient did well until 1967. At that time, during a routine
follow up examination, the patient was noted to have bi-latcral axillary
lymphadenopathy as well as evidence of "chest involvement" Because of this, he
was again treated with cobalt therapy at St. Marks Hospital in December 1967."
62,

Arnold did not consider the conveyance to be a transfer ofhis ownership rights in the

property.
63,

Arnold also requested and procured help from a number of people supporting his

request to have LaRcll discharged from the military to help him work "his1" farm, as referenced by
Exhibits 22, and 24-29,
64,

After the March 24,1967, deed, Donald did not help in fanning the trust property of

his father.
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65.

On March 1,1971, Arnold Rawlings died.

66.

During all of Arnold's lifetime, all of the income from the trust property went to

Arnold. After Arnold's death, Donald consistently represented to his siblings that the income Irom
the Ixust property was being used to support their mother.
67.

On March 30,1971, Cleo Rawlings, his widow, paid the taxes on 8.84 acres, which

included all of the trust property.
68.

Such evidence also supports the factual conclusion that Cleo likewise believed the

farm (the trust property) was the family farm.
69.

Prior to Arnold's death, Bryce Rawlings requested permission from Arnold to put a

trailer on the trust property for a residence. Arnold showed Bryce where on the trust property to
place the trailer, and Bryce lived in the trailer on the farm (the trust property) for four or five years
following Ms father's death. This evidence supports the conclusion that the parties considered the
farm a family farm.
70.

Donald enlisted Dwayne's help to install a fence upon the determined fence line

across the encroaching developed properties of neighboring owners and then negotiated with the title
companies of the subdivided lots settlements for approximately $52,000.00, (See paragraph 24
above.)
71.

From these proceeds, Donald gave $500 to Carol, $500 to Bryce, and $600 to

Dwayne, with approximately $5,000 for a care and prepayment of burial funds for Cleo. He offered
$500 to LaRell which LaRell refused.
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72.

Donald testified that the 1974 Quit-Claim Deed was not to convey any interest in the

property from Ms siblings but was only to clear up the title problem on the south boundary. The
Court is unpersuaded by Donald's testimony.
73.

In 1978 Donald and Jeanette deeded a half interest in the lot known as the Pinegar

Lot to Dwayne and Paulettc.
74.

In 1993 Donald traded a property known as the Mellwell property, shown as Exhibit

1, for 6.5 acres in Washington County, Utah. It was only after Dwayne became aware of the
Hell well trade that Donald or his spouse, for the first time, told any sibling they believed they owned
the trust property, and they were using the frmds or income from the trust property in any way they
chose.
75.

The work of all the family members on the farm, except Donald, on the irrigating,

harvesting, and marketing of the fruit, the management of the horses and the proceeds of tbe fruit
being given to the mother, Cleo, the waiting of so long to' take action by the siblings is readily
apparent by the trust that they had in their older brother (Donald) that he would do what was right,
but by his own actions during the period following the conveyance all demonstrate the farm as a
family farm,
76.

The testimony is undisputed that Donald co-mingled the funds from the trust property

with his other funds and is unable to distinguish any fluids which he spent at any time from March
24, 1967 to the day of trial as to their source whether they came from the trust property income or
from income from some other source.
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11.

The evidence in this matter is persuasive and convincing to support the conclusion

that the siblings waited a long period of time, given their trust in Iheir older brother that he would
do what was right for the family, and as buttressed by then- own actions during the period following
the conveyance.
78. The Court finds that there is no just reason for delay of entry of a final judgment
consistent with the findings and conclusions herein.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact by the Court, the Court now makes and enters the
following conclusions of law:
1.

The March 244 1967, deed from Arnold and Cleo Rawlings to Donald and Jeanette

Rawlings was not for the payment of debt to Walker Banlc and Trust Company or for the payment
of taxes.
2.

The deed transfer was for accommodation and not intended to transfer ownership to

Donald and Jeanette Rawlings.
3.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the foregoing findings of fact

establish a equitable need to impose a constructive trust on the property conveyed in the 1967 deeds
and the 1974 deeds.
4.

The actions regarding the property by Donald and Jeanette are for the benefit of the

trust property.

20

5.

From the inception of the trust, Donald Rawlings and Jeanette Rawlings received

unjust enrichment of the property which they treated as their own which included $1,000.00 of the
roughly $1,200,00 taxes that were paid by Dwayne and Ms spouse, the barn property, the proceeds
from the operation of the trust property, and approximately $52,000.00 from negotiated payments
regarding the south boundary fence dispute as well as other benefits from the use and negotiations
relative to the trust property.
6.

The Court concludes that it should enter a final judgment on the issue that was tried

as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the constructive trust issue pursuant
to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED and SIGNED this H2? day of August, 2007 .
BY THE COURT

Judge Fred How;
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

"J A Vs.-.:.. ~ / V Y ' - v

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

T'<.,iM<^

M. David Eckersly
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON

Thomas W. Seller
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JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C.

M.Dayle Jeffs

/ ^ j / / S
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLrNGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS,

[

JUDGMENT ON TSS UE OF
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND RULE
54(B) DETERMINATION

Plaintiffs,
vs.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintife,

Civil No. 970400260
Division No. 9

vs.
DONALD RAWL1NGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.
THERON LARELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTBRSON,
Third Party and Cross Plaintiffs
vs.

DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is
unknown,
|
Third Parry Defendants

|

The above-entitled matter came before the Court on March 12-15, 2007 for a bifurcated
bench trial proceeding on the issue of imposing a constructive trust. Following the presentation of
evidence and byagreement, each of theparties submitted aPost-Trial Memorandum marshaling their
arguments regarding the evidence and the law on the issue. Having considered the parties'
respective memorandums, the evidence presented at trial, and having heretofore entered itsjruling
2

on the bifiucated issue, the Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now
makes and enters the following:
JUDGMENT ON CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST ISSUE
1.

The conveyances by the 1967 and 1974 deeds created a constructive trust on the

property described therein.
2.

The Court concludes that there is no just reason for delay entry of judgment herein

on the issue that was tried as to a constructive trust and directs the entry of a judgment on the
constructive trust issue pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED and SIGNED this * ^ g ? d a y of August, 2007.
BY THE COURT

h\\
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

M. David Eckersly
ROBINSON, SEILERS, & ANDERSON

Thomas W Seller

JEFFS & JEFFS. P.C.

M. Dayle Jeffs
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS, FOR PAYMENT OF
MEDIATOR'S FEES, AND FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES OF OPPOSING
COUNSEL

ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS,
Defendants.
ARNOLD DWAYNE RAWLINGS and
PAULETTE RAWLINGS, as Trustees of the
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings Family Trust,
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
RAWLINGS, and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.
DONALD RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWLINGS, and DONALD RAWLINGS
and JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees
of a Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.
THERON LaRELL RAWLINGS, BRYCE C.
*RAWLINGS. and CAROL LYNN R.
MASTERSON,

Civil No. 970400260
Judge Howard

Third-Party Plaintiffe,
vs.
DONALD D. RAWLINGS and JEANETTE
RAWHNGS and DONALD RAWLINGS and
JEANETTE RAWLINGS as Trustees of a
Trust whose name is unknown and ARNOLD
DWAYNE RAWLINGS and PAULETTE
|
RAWLINGS and ARNOLD DWAYNE
RAWLINGS and PAULETTE RAWLINGS, |
as Trustees of a Trust whose name is unknown,
Third-Party Defendants.

I
I

This matter came before the Court on the Order to Show Cause issued by the Court on
October 12, 2006, requiring Plaintiffs to appear before this Court on the 13th day of November at
9:00 AM. and show cause, if any they have, why fees and sanctions should not be imposed for
alleged failure to comply with Rules 101(c) and/or 101(h) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed
Alternative Dispute Resolution. Said order had been issued pursuant to the motion of Theron
LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn Masterson as third party plaintiffs and
Arnold Dwayne Rawlings and Paulette Rawlings as defendants and third party plaintiffs Joint
Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees, and for Attorney's Fees of Opposing
Counsel The Court having read fhe respective submissions of the parties and having carefully
read and reread the language of the rales, the Court having reviewed the Court Rules for CourtAnnexed Alternative Dispute Resolution several times, and having heard the oral arguments of

counsel for and against said motion, and being fully advised on the premises, now makes and
enters the following:
Rule 101(c) of the Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution provides
in pertinent part that "All parties shall be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case...The mediation conference should proceed
in a fashion that furthers the goals of the mediation process, preserves confidentiality, and
encourages candor on the part of participating parties."
That provision requires good faith discussion, and while parties may terminate that
process, they may only do so after they have engaged in the settlement process in good faith.
Afer a carefiil review of the record and being fully advised in the premises by counsel for all
parties, Ifindthat the Plaintiffs came to the mediation with a fully formed intention not to
participate in the mediation in good faith and had determined that they would not be prepared to
discuss all relevant issues in this case. Ifindthese actions and formed intentions to violate Rule
101(c), above. Therefore, based upon Rule 101(c), above, and the inherent powers of the Court,
the Court grants the Joint Motion for Sanctions, for Payment of Mediator's Fees and for
Attorney's Fees of Opposing Counsel pursuant to the affidavits filed with the joint motion. The
Court orders the Plaintiffs pay the sum of $2,937.00 to the moving parties within 30 days.
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THORNE, Associate Presiding Judge:
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fl
Donald and Jeanette Rawlings (collectively, the Grantees)
appeal from the district court's entry of judgment finding an
equitable constructive trust in favor of Dwayne and Paulette
Rawlings, LaRell Rawlings, Bryce C. Rawlings, and Carol Lynn R.
Masterson (collectively, the Siblings). 1 We reverse the judgment
of the district court, as well as an order imposing sanctions
against the Grantees for failing to participate in mediation
proceedings in good faith.
f2
This dispute centers on a family farm that Arnold Rawlings
transferred to the Grantees by deed in 1967. The Grantees are
Arnold and Cleo Rawlings's oldest son, Donald, and Donald's wife,
Jeanette. The Siblings comprise the rest of Arnold and Cleo's
children, along with Dwayne's wife, Paulette. As summarized in
greater detail below, the Grantees' position in this litigation
is that they own the farm in fee simple pursuant to the 1967 deed
from Arnold. The Siblings argue that the Grantees hold the farm
in trust for the entire surviving family under a constructive
trust theory. After a four-day trial exploring the circumstances
of the 1967 deed, the district court agreed with the Siblings and
imposed an equitable constructive trust on the Grantees in regard
to the farm.
BACKGROUND
f3
Arnold acquired the farm from his mother in 1944. In 1966,
Arnold was diagnosed with cancer. Arnold believed that he would
be unable to obtain state-provided cancer treatment if he
retained the farm in his name. This belief motivated Arnold to
explore the possibility of transferring the farm to one of his
sons as a means of getting it out of his name while still keeping
it in the family. On March 24, 1967, Arnold conveyed the farm to
the Grantees by warranty deed. Arnold's wife, Cleo, also signed
the warranty deed although her name was not on the title to the
farm. That same day, each of the Siblings signed quit-claim
deeds transferring any interest they may have had in the farm to
the Grantees. The Siblings contend that the transfer to the
Grantees was always meant to be for their collective benefit as a
family farm.
1. Dwayne Rawlings Fs full name is Arnold Dwayne Rawlings, and
LaRell Rawlings's full name is Theron LaRell Rawlings. We refer
to them as Dwayne and LaRell to be consistent with references in
the record and to differentiate between Dwayne Rawlings and his
father, Arnold Rawlings. We also note that when we employ the
term the Siblings as a descriptor of the beneficiaries of the
purported trust in this case, the term includes all purported
beneficiaries, including Grantees and Arnold and Cleo Rawlings.
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1f4
After the transfer, Arnold and Cleo continued to live and
work on the farm as if no transfer had occurred. When Arnold
died in 1971, Cleo continued to live on the farm and family
members worked the farm for her benefit. In 1974, the Grantees
litigated a boundary dispute with the farm's southern neighbor.
The Grantees' success in litigating the matter led to a
settlement with several title companies, who paid the Grantees
$52,000. The Grantees kept the bulk of that money but did
distribute portions to Cleo and the Siblings.
If5
In 1978, the Grantees deeded one of the lots comprising the
farm to themselves and Dwayne and Paulette in joint tenancy.
About this same time, Donald and Dwayne began a business selling
topsoil. In 1993, the Grantees asserted, allegedly for the first
time, that they owned the farm free and clear and were not
holding it in trust for the Siblings. This dispute over the
nature of the Grantees' ownership interest in the farm led to the
dissolution of Donald and Dwaynefs business, and the Grantees
eventually sued Dwayne and Paulette. Dwayne and Paulette filed a
counterclaim and self-described third-party complaint against the
Grantees in their individual capacities and as trustees of an
alleged trust, asserting a constructive trust over the farm
property. The remainder of the Siblings joined in the
counterclaim and third-party complaint. After extensive
discovery, the district court bifurcated the parties1 disputes
and decided to first address the constructive trust Issue.
%6
Prior to trial, the district court ordered the parties to
mediate their disputes. The Grantees informed the Siblings
before mediation that they had no intent of considering any
settlement of the matter. The Grantees appeared at the mediation
session and told the mediator the same thing. The mediation
session did not result in a settlement. Afterwards, the Siblings
sought sanctions from the Grantees, alleging that they did not
participate in mediation in good, faith. The district court
agreed, and ordered the Grantees to pay the Siblings $293 7 in
expenses that the Siblings had incurred di iring the mediation
process.
II" 7
A four™day trial on the constructive trust issue commenced
on March 12, 2007. The bulk of the trial was comprised of the
Siblings' testimony describing the circumstances of the 1967
transfer and the family's treatment of the farm property after
that date. Several of the Siblings testified to conversations
that they had had with Arnold prior to the transfer,
conversations that the Siblings interpreted as expressing an
intent to place the farm in trust. The Grantees used the
Siblings' testimony to explore issues regarding the Grantees1
payment of debts owed by Arnold, which the Grantees argued
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supported their position that Arnold intended to transfer the
farm to them in fee simple.
^8
At the close of the Siblings' evidence, the Grantees moved
for dismissal of the Siblings' constructive trust claims. The
Grantees' motion and the Siblings' opposition to that motion
relied on very different legal theories as to how the district
court should evaluate the evidence at trial. The Grantees argued
that the only way a constructive trust could have arisen in this
case is if Arnold had attempted to create an express trust at the
time of the transfer, but that express trust failed due to the
lack of a writing evidencing the trust. Under the Grantees'
theory, no trust was created unless Arnold intended to transfer
the farm property into trust and Arnold and the Grantees were in
a confidential relationship at the time of the transfer. The
Siblings theory was much broader, asserting that the district
court could simply employ its equitable powers to impose a
constructive trust if it felt the circumstances warranted it.
The district court requested written briefing from the parties on
their respective positions and took the matter under advisement.
The Grantees then presented their case, comprised solely of their
own brief testimony, and the trial concluded.
f9
Two months after trial, the district court ruled on the
constructive trust issue. The district court expressly adopted
the Siblings' argument that it could impose a trust relying
solely on equitable principles and without regard to Arnold's
intent or relationship to the Grantees at the time of transfer.
The ruling recited an extensive factual summary of the testimony
at trial, rejected the Grantees' alternative argument that the
transfer was in consideration of them paying off a prior
mortgage, and determined that Arnold had intended the conveyance
solely as a mechanism to protect the family's ownership of the
farm and did not intend the deed to operate as an actual transfer
at all. The ruling concluded with the statement that the
district court was "exercis[ing] its equitable powers to impose a
constructive trust." In findings of fact prepared from the
district court's ruling and later signed by the court, the court
found as a factual matter that "Arnold did not consider the
[1967] conveyance to be a transfer of his ownership rights in the
[farm]."
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
flO On appeal from the district court's final order imposing an
equitable constructive trust, the Grantees argue that the
Siblings failed to present sufficient evidence in the district
court to support the imposition of a trust under the
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circumstances of this case/ "'When an appellant is essentially
challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a clearly
erroneous standard of appellate review applies. {n Hi-Country
Estates Homeowners Ass ( n v. Bagley & Co. , 2008 UT App 10 5, ^ 10,
182 P.3d 417 (quoting Reinbold v. Utah Fun Shares, 850 P.2d 487,
4 89 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)). However, we review a district court's
decisions on questions of law, such as the legail requirements for
the imposition of constructive trusts, for correctness. See,
e.g., Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, f 8, 71 P.3d 589 ("The validity
of [a] trust is an issue of law, which we review for
correctness.").
fll The Grantees also argue that the district court erred when
it imposed sanctions against the Grantees based on their alleged
lack of good faith participation in court-ordered mediation. The
proper interpretation of court rules presents an issue of law
that we review for correctness. See , e.g., N. A.. R. , Inc .. v . Farr,
2000 UT App 62, 1f 5, 997 P. 2d 343 ("'A trial court's
interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration presents a question of law reviewed for
correctness. ' " (quoting Loporto v. Hoegemann, 199 9 LIT App 175,
% 5, 982 P.2d 586)).
ANALYSIS
The District Court's Finding of an Equitable
Cons truet ive Tri is t
fl2 The Grantees first challenge the evidentiary basis for thedistrict court's imposition of an equitable constructive trust.
Specifically, the Grantees argue that there is no evidence to
support two elements that they assert must exist in order to
impose a constructive trust in this case: (1) that a
confidential relationship existed between Arnold and the Grantees
at the time Arnold transferred the farm to the Grantees and
(2) that Arnold intended to transfer ownership of the farm to the
Grantees in trust for the Siblings. The Siblings counter that •
neither a confidential relationship nor any particular intent on
the part of Arnold is a prerequisite to a court's imposition of a
constructive trust on purely equitable principles. Thus, we
first determine the proper legal analysis for the constructive
trust issue and then turn to the question of whether the Grantees
have identified an evidentiary barrier to the impositi on of a
crust in favor of the Siblings.
2. The Grantees also raise a statute of limitations argument
that we decline to address in light of our resolution of the case
in the Grantees T favor on other grounds.
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A.

Trust Requirements

1Jl3 The Grantees and the Siblings present us, and presented the
district court, with two conflicting theories for the proper
analysis of this case. Confusingly, although the theories are
conceptually quite different, they are both properly referred to
as constructive trusts. The legal constructive trust theory
urged by the Grantees allows for the enforcement, in certain
circumstances, of an express trust that would otherwise be
unenforceable. By contrast, the Siblings' equitable constructive
trust approach does not enforce an otherwise unenforceable
express trust, but rather creates and imposes a trust in equity
to avoid the unjust' enrichment of one who has committed some
wrongful act. The district court accepted the Siblings1 theory
of the case and ruled accordingly. We disagree, and hold that,
because the Siblings' claim for relief ultimately relies on a
purported unwritten express trust created by Arnold, the
Grantees' theory is the proper approach under the circumstances
of this case.
fl4 The law relating to the creation and enforcement of express
trusts is well settled and imposes various rules intended largely
to protect the sanctity of property rights and the written
instruments transferring those rights. See, e.g., Jewell v.
Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328, 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961) (imposing clear
and convincing evidence standard upon the attempted "overthrow of
a clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered"). An
express trust is "a fiduciary relationship with respect to
property, arising as a result of a manifestation of intent to
create it and subjecting the person in whom title is vested to
equitable duties to deal with it for the benefit of others."
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added).
Thus, when an express trust is claimed to have been created
through an inter vivos transfer, the expressed intention of the
grantor is perhaps the central element in the claim.
1fl5 Further, when no written instrument evidences a trust
involving real property, the trust is enforceable only in limited
circumstances. See id. (adopting section 45 of the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts)/ Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 45 (1957)
(stating circumstances under which an otherwise unenforceable
express trust may be enforced by third-party beneficiaries). One
circumstance under which an unwritten land trust may be enforced
is when the grantor and grantee of the real property were, at the
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time of the transfer, in a confidential relationship.3 Thus, the
Grantees argue, a legal constructive trust may be imposed only
upon evidence of Arnold's intent to create a trust as well as a'
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees.
%±6 The Siblings argue, and the district court accepted, that an
equitable constructive trust is an available remedy in this case.
"Courts recognize a constructive trust as a matter of equity
where there has been (1) a wrongful act, (2) unjust enrichment,
and (3) specific property that can be traced to the wrongful
behavior. " Wilcox v. Anchor Wate Co., 2007 UT 39, 1f 34, 164 P. 3d
353. "Such trusts are usually imposed where injustice would
result if a party were able to keep money or property that
rightfully belonged to another." Id. "To establish a wrongful
act under Utah law, an entity must have obviously received funds
by mistake or participated in active or egregious misconduct."
Id. f 35; see, e.g., In Re Unicom Computer Corp., 13 F.3d 321
322 (9th Cir. 1994) (involving a case where a creditor mistakenly
transferred money to a debtor); Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Jolley, 24
Utah 2d 187, 467 P.2d 984, 984 (1970) (involving a constructive
trust that was placed on a third person after she was given a
stolen automobile).
1Jl7 The problem with the application of the Siblings1 approach
to the circumstances of this case is that the only wrongful act
alleged by the Siblings is the Grantees' failure to comply with
Arnold's expressed intentions at the time of the transfer. If
Arnold did not have and express an intent that the 1967 deed
transfer the farm property to the Grantees in trust, then the
Grantees taking of the farm property in fee simple under the
express language of the deed cannot be deemed wrongful.
Conversely, in order for the Grantees' conduct to have been
wrongful, Arnold would have needed to express his intent to
transfer the farm property into trust--i.e., Arnold would have
had to have attempted to create an express trust. Thus, the very
circumstances that might entitle the Siblings to equitable relief
trigger the application of the various legal rules governing the
creation and enforcement of express trusts.
fl8 The Siblings seek to use the law of equitable constructive
trusts as a substitute for the law governing the enforcement of
express trusts. As well-intentioned as the district court's
application of equitable principles in this case may have been,
the practical effect of allowing the sort of equitable concerns
3. The other circumstances described in section. 4 5 of the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts have not been raised In th: s
matter.
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presented in this case to trump written deeds would be that "no
person could longer rest in the security of his title to
property, however solemn might be the instrument on which it was
founded." Jewell, 366 P.2d at 598 (internal quotation marks
omitted) . The law governing the enforcement of express trusts is
clear and must be applied even when it produces results that,
under a pure fairness standard, might arguably be deemed
inequitable. Cf. Ashton, 733 P. 2d at 151 (holding that where an
oral express trust exists, section 45 of the Restatement (Second)
of Trusts is "controlling") .
fl9 In sum, there are only two possible ways of characterizing
the Grantees' actions in this case. They either acted in
violation of Arnold ! s expressed intent, implicating the law of
express trusts and their enforcement by constructive trust, or
they committed no wrongful act at all. Either possibility is
fatal to the imposition of a trust under the Siblings' equitable
constructive trust theory, which is premised on avoiding unjust
enrichment. We thus determine that the district court erred when
it imposed a trust under the Siblings' theory. Although this
determination necessitates our reversal of the district court's
judgment in the Siblings1 favor, questions remain as to whether
the matter can be concluded in either party's favor as a matter
of law or whether it must be remanded for further proceedings.
To answer these questions, we turn to the Grantees' evidentiary
arguments.
B.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

f20 Having accepted the Grantees' application of the law of
express trusts as the proper approach for evaluating this case,
we examine the particular elements urged by the Grantees and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support those elements. It is
somewhat unusual for an appellate court to be asked to determine
whether there was sufficient evidence to support findings that
were not actually made by a trial court. Ordinarily, when the
district court applies the wrong legal standard the matter is
reversed and remanded so that the district court may consider the
evidence under the proper standard. Here, however, the Grantees
ask us to simply reverse the district court without remand,
arguing that the evidence presented can only lead to a finding of
no enforceable trust as a matter of law.
f21 We agree with the Grantees that there is no enforceable
unwritten express trust in this case, although we do so based on
the district court's findings rather than on our own evaluation
of the evidence presented below. After a four-day trial on the
issue of Arnold's intent at the time of the 1967 deed, the
district court made extensive factual findings about the
circumstances surrounding Arnold's execution of the deed. One of
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these findings was that "Arnold did not consider the conveyance
to be a transfer of his ownership rights i n the [farm.] . Ir
f22 This finding of Arnold's lack of intent is necessarily
incompatible with the definition of an express trust, which
requires the grantor's "manifestation of intent to create it."
See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 151 (Utah 1987). An inter
vivos trust can be created in these circumstances only by a
grantor's intent to transfer property into trust. Cf. Leggroan
v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93, 232 P.2d 746, 748
(1951) (n[T]he test for determining whether a writing has
effected a trust or is testamentary in character is whether the
maker intended the instrument to have any effect until after his
death, or whether he intended to transfer some present interest.
If, therefore, the father intended to pass legal title to the
son, as trustee, . , , then the transaction was a valid trust." •
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, as
found by the district court, Arnold did not intend to transfer
the farm at all, and we can thus conclude only that he did not
intend to transfer the farm into trust. Without Arnold's intent
to transfer the farm into trust, there can be no express trust to
enforce, directly or by imposition of a legal constructive trust,
and the Grantees were entitled to judgment establishing their
ownership of the farm under the express terms of Arnold's
"clearly-expressed deed, solemnly executed and delivered." See
Jewell v. Horner, 12 Utah 2d 328^ 366 P.2d 594, 597 (1961).4
f23 Under these circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that
there can be no express trust in favor of the Siblings.
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's judgment on the
trust issue and remand this matter for entry of judgment
establishing fee simple ownership of the farm, in the Grantees.
II.

The District Court's Sanctions Order

f24 The Grantees also challenge the district court's order
imposing sanctions against them for failing to use good faith in
participating in court-ordered mediation. We agree with the
Grantees that such sanctions are inappropriate under the
circumstances.
f25 The Siblings sought sanctions against the Grantees after an
unsuccessful court-ordered mediation session. According to the
Siblings1 motion in the district: court, the Grantees informed the
4. In light of the effect of the district court's finding that
Arnold did not intend to transfer the farm, we need not address
the question of whether the evidence could demonstrate a
confidential relationship between Arnold and the Grantees.
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Siblings prior to mediation that the Grantees did not want to
participate in mediation and did not intend to make any proposals
or consider any settlement offers in the mediation. The Siblings
also asserted that " [a]t the June 27, 2006 mediation, [the
Grantees] informed the mediator that they would neither make any
offer nor consider any offer that he might present to them, and
that they would refuse to attempt to resolve this case other than
to let the matter go to trial." The district court found that
the Grantees "came to the mediation with a fully formed intention
not to participate in the mediation in good faith and had
determined that they would not be prepared to discuss all
relevant issues in this case" and awarded sanctions against the
Grantees.
^[26 Mediation proceedings are governed by rule 101 of the Utah
Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution. See Utah
R. Ct. ADR 101. Rule 101(c) mandates that "[a]11 parties shall
be present, shall be prepared to discuss, and shall have the
authority to fully settle, all relevant issues in the case." Id.
R. 101(c). However, "[t]he parties may terminate the proceedings
at any time." Id. R. 101(g). The rule further contemplates the
circumstances under which sanctions may be imposed against a
party: "Upon written recommendation by the mediator or motion by
any party, the court may order absent parties to show cause why
they failed to attend the mediation conference and, if
appropriate, why sanctions should not be imposed." Id. R. 101(h)
(emphasis added).
127 Here, it is undisputed that the Grantees attended the
mediation conference. However, the district court concluded that
the Grantees! actions at and prior to the conference violated
rule 101(c). Interpreting that rule, the district court stated
that it "requires good faith discussion, and while parties may
terminate that process, they may only do so after they have
engaged in the settlement process in good faith." This
interpretation is flatly contradicted by language elsewhere in
the rule, which clearly states that "parties may terminate the
proceedings at any time." See Utah R. Ct. ADR 101(g) (emphasis
added) . The rule also contemplates sanctions only when a party
fails to attend a mediation conference, not when a party's
actions at the conference fail to lead to a settlement. See id.
R. 101(h); cf. Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So. 2d 988, 989-90 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (quashing sanctions order where the "basis
for sanctions [was] merely that defendants were unwilling to make
an offer of settlement satisfactory to [plaintiff]"). Finally,
we disagree with the district court that the Grantees acted in
bad faith or violated rule 101(c). It appears that they merely
held a firm belief, vindicated by our decision today, in the
validity of their claims such that they had no interest in a
compromised settlement. Promptly informing the other parties and
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the mediator of this fact served to avoid unnecessary time and
resources spent in unproductive mediation efforts and cannot be
viewed as evidence of bad faith under the circumstances so longas the Grantees otherwise complied with the terms of the rule."'
f28 For these reasons, we hold that the district court erred in
sanctioning the Grantees for their actions at and leading up to
the court-ordered mediation conference. Accordingly, we also
reverse the order awarding sanctions and direct that all parties
bear their own costs and fees arising from the failed mediation.
CONCLUSION
^J29 We determine that the district court erred in finding that a
purely equitable constructive trust can arise under the
circumstances presented in this case. Rather, the only potential
relief available to the Siblings is the enforcement, by means of
a constructive trust, of an alleged unwritten express trust. We
have determined, however, that an express trust can only exist in
this case if Arnold intended to transfer the farm into trust and
that the district court's finding that Arnold did not intend to
transfer the farm at all precludes an express trust from arising
in this case as a matter of law.6 Accordingly, we reverse the
district court's judgment on the trust issue and remand this
matter for entry of judgment in the Grantees' favor.
*|'30 We also reverse the district court's order awarding
sanctions against the Grantees for failing to engage in good
faith participation in court-ordered mediation. Rule 101 of the
Utah Rules of Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution
implicitly contemplates sanctions against parties solely for
failing to appear at a mediation conference, and explicitly
guarantees the rights of parties to terminate the proceedings at
any time. For these reasons, we hold that the district court's

5. We also note that our decision today is consistent with the
high degree of confidentiality afforded to the mediation process.
See, e.g., Reese v. Tingev Constr., 2008 UT 7, f 8, 177 P.3d 605
(expressing the policy that mediation communications "be
protected from postmediation disclosure") .
6. To the extent that the district court's finding of Arnold's
intent potentially affects the validity of the deed itself or
requires further findings about the farm's ownership or chain of
title, such matters exceed the scope of today's decision, and we
express no opinion thereon.
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imposition of sanctions against the Grantees was improper under
the circumstances.
f31

Reversed and remanded.

Y
William A. Thorne Jr.,
Associate Presiding Judge

532

WE CONCUR:

£me.
Presiding Judge

Gregoj^ K. Orme, Judge
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